Being is not an object. An interpretation of Parmenides’ fragment DK B2 and a reflection on assumptions

My article shows that the following unargued-for assumptions underlie the mainstream interpretation of Parmenides: that being is an object; that knowledge does not come from experience; that knowing is the same as being able to articulate knowledge in true propositions. I show how these assumptions result from an —implicit or explicit— choice. I refer to the different choices made by Avicenna, Descartes and, Śaṅkara on the issue of what we can be certain of. I provide an interpretation of DKB2 —where the unknowability of not-being, is argued, not merely postulated— which yields a coherent and meaningful interpretation of Parmenides’ Proem. My interpretation has affinities with Néstor Cordero’s, who regards being as the fact of being, and Tony Long’s, Donna Giancola’s, David Sedley’s, and others who embrace the ‘natural reading’ of B3.