Beginselen van goed markttoezicht. Gedefinieerd, verklaard en uitgewerkt voor het toezicht op de financiële markten

M. Aelen

Research output: ThesisDoctoral thesis 1 (Research UU / Graduation UU)


In this thesis, principles of good market supervision are defined, declared and explained for the supervision of the financial markets. The supervisory authorities referred to in this thesis (the Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets, the Dutch Healthcare Authority, the Dutch Central Bank and the Authority for the Financial Markets) are part of a complex force field, where requirements from different perspectives apply to the supervision in question. This study distinguishes an economic perspective, a political-administrative perspective and a legal perspective. These perspectives serve to formulate requirements that are not always easily compatible. The following categories of principles of good supervision can be identified: (i) principles of effective supervision, (ii) principles of democratically legitimised supervision, and (iii) principles of proper supervision. Together, these principles make up the principles of good supervision. Out of these three categories, the key principles of good market supervision are distilled. These are the principle of independence, the principle of transparency and the principle of accountability. The principle of independence requires the supervisory authority to be independent, both institutionally and operationally, from its most important stakeholders: the market and politics. The institutional independence of Dutch supervisory authorities with regard to the political arena varies. Currently, an unambiguous vision regarding independence is lacking and should be developed. This could be seen during the financial crisis. Where the circumstances required greater independence (because the state acquired a greater interest in de financial market as a result of nationalisations and state aid), the minister acquired greater control over the supervisory authorities. With regard to market independence, the greatest challenge is to prevent regulatory capture. One must be strongly aware of the fact that regulatory capture usually goes undetected and is a subconscious phenomenon. The principle of independence should be counterbalanced by the principles of accountability and transparency. Otherwise, the supervisory authority would not be democratically legitimized. The principle of accountability requires supervisory authorities to report on their actions. Especially political accountability and public accountability can be strengthened. Political accountability can be enhanced by increasing the role of the Parliament and by involving High Councils of State more closely in the process. Involving representative organisations of consumers more closely in the process can enhance public accountability. Transparency is an important prerequisite for accountability. In addition, obligations of disclosure are assumed to have an internal learning effect. Moreover, transparency options are more and more widely used to improve the effectiveness of supervision. Greater transparency therefore promotes more effective supervision and improves accountability. With regard to the supervision of financial markets, secrecy requirements hinder transparency and accountability. To allow for greater independence, the possibilities for supervisory authorities to be transparent should be as great as possible. The recommendations that are made in this doctoral thesis, aim at creating an optimal environment for supervisory authorities to be effective and democratically legitimized at the same time. In short, they aim at establishing greater independence on the one hand, and greater accountability and transparency on the other hand.
Original languageDutch
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Utrecht University
  • Ottow, A.T., Primary supervisor
  • Lavrijssen, S.A.C.M., Co-supervisor
Award date26 Sept 2014
Print ISBNs978-90-8974-982-6
Publication statusPublished - 26 Sept 2014

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