Are politically connected firms more likely to evade Taxes? Evidence from Tunisia

Bob Rijkers*, Hassen Arouri, Leila Baghdadi

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleAcademicpeer-review

Abstract

Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6%more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4% more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)S166-S175
JournalWorld Bank Economic Review
Volume30
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Mar 2017
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

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