Abstract
This article argues that individual philosophical commitments of scientists can decisively
influence scientific practice. To support this claim, two historical examples are presented,
concerning controversies between physicists about central problems in their field. Confrontation
of the theories of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan with these examples reveals their
inadequacy to explain the role- of individual commitments. It is concluded that an adequate
model of scientific change should exhibit a three-level structure.
influence scientific practice. To support this claim, two historical examples are presented,
concerning controversies between physicists about central problems in their field. Confrontation
of the theories of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan with these examples reveals their
inadequacy to explain the role- of individual commitments. It is concluded that an adequate
model of scientific change should exhibit a three-level structure.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 125-151 |
| Journal | Philosophica |
| Volume | 58 |
| Publication status | Published - 1996 |