Abstract
This article draws attention to the constitutive requirements of
intergenerational justice and exposes the limitations of regulative
arguments based on international human rights law. Intergenerational
justice demands constraining the regulative freedom of the
international community, and it is tempting to assume that adequate
constraints are already contained within existing treaties including
international human rights treaties. In fact, intergenerational justice
demands bespoke constitutional norms at the international level, and
it demands entrenching constitutional norms. International human
rights law per se implies neither of these constitutive propositions and
both are problematic in light of the present structure of international
law. Nevertheless, a combination of arguments concerning
intergenerational justice and the systemic implications of human
dignity yield a more constitutive account of human rights and
therefore an internal critique of the overall architecture of international
law.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 272-290 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Human Rights |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 4 May 2016 |
Keywords
- political science