Abstract
A well known logical loophole for Bell’s theorem is that it relies on setting independence: the assumption that the state of a system is independent of the settings of a measurement apparatus probing the system. In this paper the implications of rejecting this assumption are studied from an operationalist perspective. To this end a generalization of the ontic models framework is proposed that allows setting dependence. It is shown that within this framework Bell’s theorem reduces to the conclusion that no-signaling requires randomness at the epistemic level even if the underlying ontology is taken to be deterministic. The ideas underlying the framework are further used to defend setting dependence against the charges of being incompatible with free will and scientific methodology. The paper ends however with the sketch of a new problem for setting dependence: a necessary gap between the ontic and the epistemic level that may prevent the formulation of a successful setting dependent theory.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 260-282 |
Journal | Foundations of Physics |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2019 |
Keywords
- setting independence
- Bell's theorem
- superdeterminism
- retro-causality
- free will