Against the De Minimis Principle

Björn Lundgren; H. Orri Stefánsson

doi:10.1111/risa.13445

Against the De Minimis Principle

Björn Lundgren^*, H. Orri Stefánsson

^*Corresponding author for this work

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Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Academic › peer-review

Abstract

According to the class of de minimis decision principles, risks can be ignored (or at least treated very differently from other risks) if the risk is sufficiently small. In this article, we argue that a de minimis threshold has no place in a normative theory of decision making, because the application of the principle will either recommend ignoring risks that should not be ignored (e.g., the sure death of a person) or it cannot be used by ordinary bounded and information-constrained agents.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	908-914
Journal	Risk Analysis
Volume	40
Issue number	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13445
Publication status	Published - 20 May 2020
Externally published	Yes

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10.1111/risa.13445Licence: CC BY

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Against the De Minimis Principle

Abstract

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