Since 2000s, the enforcement power of the Union has started to expand. The EU legislator has been prescribing more on national enforcement of EU law. Promotion of enforcement has been organised via an increasing number of EU networks of national enforcers and transnational arrangements alike. And, most relevant for this symposium, EU agencies have become involved in promoting enforcement, including via receiving direct enforcement powers, i.e. powers to monitor compliance with EU laws by private actors, investigate possible violations and sanction for non-compliance. While the shift of enforcement power to the same governance level as where the norm has originated from can be explained (e.g. by the theory of functional spill-over) and may seem necessary, especially if the ‘default rule’ (enforcement at the national level) does not work, this shift and evolution of power lead to a number of questions. These are the questions of legitimacy, controls, and effective enforcement. These questions are even more peculiar in the case when EU agencies receive enforcement powers: neither EU’s enforcement competence nor EU agencies are the issues that are clearly defined by the treaties. This Op-ed discusses these questions to highlight this emerging actor –‘EU enforcement agency model’ – on the EU governance landscape, which, as it argues, necessitates further public and academic debate to ensure democratic credentials of the Union and the rule of law.